On context-aware artifacts and socially responsible design by Lueg, CP
ON CONTEXT -AWARE ARTIFACTS
AND SOCIALLY RESPONSmLE DESIGN
Christopher Lueg
Department of Information Systems, University of Technology Sydney
lueg@it.uts.edu.au
http://www.it.uts.edu.au
ABSTRACT
Context-aware artifacts are of particular interest to HCI researchers as the user's interaction with artifacts moves
from rather static desktops to less well-structured environments. Most work in developing such artifacts appears to
be technology-driven by which we mean that often not much time is spent on exploring and clarifying the underlying
concepts of context. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the discussion of context by outlining an explicit
distinction between the concept of context as a characterization of a situation and the situation itself which we
understand as a social construct in the first place. Acknowledging this difference suggests that designers of context-
aware artifacts should pay particular attention to the fact that the context determined by context-aware artifacts
may differ from what the persons involved in a social setting have negotiated. In such a situation, it should be
possible to overrule the context-aware artifact in such a way that the artifact's behavior does no longer interfere
with the situation that has been negotiated among peers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Context-aware artifacts are of particular interest to the Hcr community as the interaction with artifacts
and their interfaces moves from rather static desktops to less well structured environments. When
referring to computational artifacts, context-awareness means that artifacts are to some extent able to
sense the context in which they are being used. The idea is that artifacts determine the actual context of
their use and adapt their functionality to what their designers considered helpful in the respective context.
An almost classical example for the potential benefit of context-aware artifacts is a context-aware mobile
phone. As Hull et al. (1997) put it: "Who really wants their mobile communicator to ring while in the
midst of a theatre audience?" A context-aware mobile would use context aspects, such as the user's
identity, the user's location, and the user's current schedule, to determine the level of intrusiveness that
would be appropriate when trying to notify the user of incoming calls. Notifications could range from
ringing (quite intrusive) to buzzing or vibrating (less intrusive). The mobile even might suppress
notifications ofless important calls (not intrusive at all).
Context-aware artifacts are here (Bellotti and Edwards 2001) and they are to stay. Most work in
developing context-aware artifacts, however, appears to be technology-driven by which we mean that
development is driven by what it technically feasible rather than by what might be helpful in a situation.
The difference between these two approaches matters if we consider social aspects that cannot be sensed
by currently available technology (see below for examples). As a consequence, the context determined by
context-aware artifacts may differ from what persons involved in the situation experience. Often, not
much effort is spent on clarifying unexpected and unwanted implications of context-aware artifacts (and
technology in general).
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the discussion of context by making an explicit distinction
between the concept of context as a characterization of a situation and the situation itself which we
understand as a social construct in the first place. We argue that some of the difficulties with artifacts
making use of context arise because of the fundamental difference between context and situation: while a
situation is open to interpretation and (re- )negotiation, the opportunity is lost once a situation is
characterized as context. Acknowledging this difference suggests that users should be able to overrule a
context-aware artifact in such a way that the artifact's behavior does no longer interfere with the situation
negotiated among those participating in the situation.
We proceed as follows. First, we discuss a definition of context that seems to be typical for a lot of
research in context-aware artifacts. Based on this definition, we outline the difference between context
and situation. Then, we discuss the role of (re-)negotiation in the usage of artifacts and outline why this is
problematic for context-aware artifacts. Finally, we draw our conclusions and outline future research
directions.
2. A DEFINITION OF CONTEXT
In the anchor article of the 2001 HCI special issue on context-aware artifacts, Dey et al. (2001) review
several definitions of context. They start with the defmition given in Webster's Dictionary: "the whole
situation, background or environment relevant to some happening or personality" and argue that this
defmition it is too general to be useful in context-aware computing. Considering some other definitions as
well, they finally provide a defmition of context that is based on information that characterize a situation
and that are relevant to the interaction between a user and its application:
"Any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity, where an entity is a person,
place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and its application, including
the user and the application themselves. Context is typically the location, identity and state of people,
groups and computational and physical objects." (Dey et al., 2001).
This defmition as well as most other defmitions of context indicate that context is related to situations but
the nature of this relation remains unclear. It seems that "situation" compromises "everything" while
"context" consists of specific aspects that were distilled from a particular situation in order to characterize
that situation. Examples for such aspects provided by Dey et al, (2001) include location, identity, and
state of people, groups and computational and physical objects. Hull et al, (1997) list identity, locations,
companions, vital signs, air quality, and network availability as examples of context aspects. Accordingly,
it seems to be reasonable to defme context -as used in context-aware artifacts- as a model or a
representation of a particular type of situation.
3. IMPLICA nONS OF USING CONTEXT
Acknowledging that context is a representation of a situation has various implications. In what follows we
discuss the most important ones.
3.1 Context and the Frame Problem in AI
The frame problem (e.g., Pylyshyn 1987) is one of the hard problems in classical representation-based
artificial intelligence. Roughly, the frame problem is about what aspects of the world have to be included
in a sufficiently detailed world model and how such a world model can be kept up-to-date when the world
changes. However, the world is constantly changing, intrinsically unpredictable, and infmitely rich
(Pfeifer and Rademakers 1991) and the frame problem has shown to be intractable at least in the general
case. Lessons learned from investigations of the frame problem suggest that there is little hope that
research on context-aware artifacts will succeed in overcoming the problem that context -understood as a
representation of a situation- is always limited. The frame problem is indirectly addressed by Greenberg
(2001) noting that for context-aware artifacts it may be difficult or impossible to determine an
appropriate set of canonical contextual states. Also. it mav be difficult to determine what information is
necessary to infer a contextual state. Grodin (2001) makes a related point when he argues that "[...]
capturing context digitally alters it fundamentally. The context that is captured is removed from its
context, namely the context that is not captured".
Of course, the hardness of the frame problem does not suggest to abandon research on context-aware
artifacts (such artifacts are here and they are to stay) but to keep in mind that such artifacts may well fail
when trying to recognize a situation.
3.2 Context and Situation
The relevance of the frame problem suggests to further explore the relation of context and situation.
Research in situatedness (e.g., Suchman 1987; Clancey 1997) is interested in the specific characteristics
of usage contexts and situations. Contrary to most research in context-aware artifacts, however, research
in situatedness understands the characteristics of a situation as resources for (human) cognition and
(human) action in the first place. This means that research in situatedness is not so much interested in
isolating specific aspects but in understanding how and to what extent these aspects influence cognition
and action when used as resources.
The term "situated" has its origins in the sociology literature in the context of the relation of knowledge,
identity, and society. It is in particular the social connotation of the term "situated" that allows to
highlight the differences between "context" as a characterization of a situation and the "situation" itself.
"Situation" is the physical and social environment in which situatedness -using a situation as resource for
action- occurs. A "situation" is an observer-independent and potentially unlimited resource that is always
open to re-interpretation. "Context", to the contrary, is an expression of a certain interpretation of a
situation is observer-dependent and therefore no longer open to re-interpretation: the meaning of aspects
included in the context description is more or less determined and other potentially relevant aspects may
not be included in the context description.
The openness to re-interpretation matters as (individual) users may decide to assign significance to
aspects of the environment that were not considered as significant before. Related to this is that users may
decide to use artifacts in a way that is different from what has been envisioned by the artifact's designer.
Based on their capability to "use" situations as resources, humans are not only able to use artifacts
according to the (assumed) intentions of their designers but humans are also capable of creating novel
usage situations that are different from what designers originally envisioned. Referring to
phenomenology, Dourish (2001) outlines that designers may influence how artifacts are being used but
they have no absolute control. Meaning arises in the course of action: the meaning of a technology is not
inherent in the technology but arises from how that technology is used. A regular hammer can be used to
illustrate the point. In most cases, such a hammer will be used according to the (assumed) intentions of
the hammer's designer. However, a hammer could also be used as a paper weight. This particular usage
may not be envisioned by the hammer's designer but its weight, its shape, and the specific circumstances
of the situation in which a paper weight is needed allow to do so. In this sense, even the use of an artifact
by a single isolated person involves negotiation based on socially developed knowledge about the nature
of the artifact, knowledge about its common use and its intended use.
The situation is even more complicated if more than one person is involved. Cars or powerful computers
on one's desktop are technically more advanced examples for illustrating how the use of artifacts may be
re-negotiated. Both artifacts can be used as effective tools for transporting things and processing data,
respectively, but both may also function as status symbols (Wenger, 1998). Context-aware artifacts are
not involved in such negotiations which means that they are hardly able to recognize the outcome.
3.3 Context and Negotiation
Situations are always subject to negotiation among the persons involved in the situation. As Lave (1991)
puts it, "learning, thinking, and knowing are relations among people engaged in activity in, with, and
arising from the socially and culturally structured world". There is little doubt that context-aware artifacts
may provide benefit in certain situation if the context they sense fits what participants in the situation
have negotiated. However, as Agre (2001) notes, context-aware artifacts may fail annoyingly as soon as a
context-aware system's (wrong) choices become significant.
Agre (200l)'s argument draws from the observation that people use the various features of their physical
environment as resources for the social construction of a place, i.e., it is through their ongoing, concerted
effort that the place-opposed to space--comes into being. An artifact will be incapable of registering the
most basic aspects of this socially constructed environment.
Context-aware buildings (also referred to as cooperative buildings) are a nice example for the potential
benefit and pitfalls involved. Using currently available technology, a room in such a building could
monitor its electronic schedule, the number of persons in the room, and the prevalence of business
clothing among the persons in the room. The room could compute that the current context is a "business
meeting context" and could instruct attendees' mobile phones not to disturb the meeting and business-
related information could be projected onto the room's multi-purpose walls.
However, being a social situation in the first place, a meeting does not only depend on the already
mentioned aspects but also on what has been negotiated among the participants. This means that even if a
particular situation fits the description of a "meeting context", the situation may have changed into an
informal get together and vice versa. The subtle changes are hardly recognizable as commonly mentioned
context aspects, such as the ones mentioned by Dey et al. (200 I) (location, identity, state of people,
groups and computational and physical objects) may not change at all. In a sense, the context does not
change while the surrounding situation does. Examples for such situational changes are unexpected
breaks or being well ahead of the schedule so that a meeting finishes earlier than expected. Once the
meeting has changed its nature, it may no longer be appropriate to block mobile calls and it may no
longer be welcome to project business-related information on walls (as it would demonstrate that the
hosting company's expensive technology did not recognize an obvious change in the meeting situation).
Robertson (2000) provides a nice example of a business situation that changes although all 'indicators'
that could be sensed by artifacts do not appear to undergo recognizable changes. Conducting a workplace
observation in a software company, Robertson attended weekly meetings over a period of seven months,
making separate video and audio recordings of relevant meeting activities. One of the questions to answer
was what designers were doing during these meetings. Robertson reports:
"Amongst the talk, laughter and other activities, there was clearly a pattern to each meeting. Individuals
reported what they had done while apart. Others would ask questions and each person's work would be
discussed by the group. Then another person would report on her work. This process continued until
everyone, who had worked on the project through the week, had told the others what she had done.
Reporting was always followed by a period of shared designing, where the group worked together on
some aspect of the design. Then, towards the end of the meeting, the work for the next week would be
negotiated and allocated."
Robertson notes that from an observer's perspective it would be easy to divide the group's meeting into
different stages, such as reporting, discussion, shared design, negotiations of future work, and fmally
allocation of work. One of the central findings of the workplace observation, however, was that the
participants in the process did not describe their work with such labels: "[...] they did not bother with
names for specific stages in their work, as they lived it, at all". Robertson concludes:
"[...] naming the stages in the design work in this way excludes entirely the work of coordination and
negotiation that made the process they represent possible in the first place. Moreover, this
communicative work had been identified by the designers themselves as the work they most wanted
supported. "
The most important point for this paper about context-aware artifacts is how the process was going on:
"[...] people did all these kinds of cooperative design work while sitting round a table talking together. At
times they moved around the room, entered or left the room and moved various objects around; but there
were no formal changes of position, no discernible interactional difficulties and certainly no upheaval
when they changed from one kind of work to another. [...] Whatever they did was always accomplished
by different combinations of their purposeful, embodied actions"
As Robertson notes, the latter was not a particularly original insight as it has been recognized by a variety
of people before. However. these people are researchers from theoretical traditions including
ethnomethodologists, practitioners of interaction analysis, computer-supported cooperative work
researchers, exponents of distributed cognition, and so on. We feel, however, that these insights have not
yet received the attention they deserve in the discussion around context-aware artifacts.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF CONTEXT-AWARE ARTIFACTS
Hull et al, (1997) describe the potential value of context-aware applications (they actually use the term
situated applications). Areas where artifacts are expected to provide benefit include augmented reality,
providing localized information, context-based retrieval, situated reminders, appropriate behavior of
devices, and monitoring. Hull et al. (2001) provide concrete examples of situations in which users may
benefit from the capabilities of context-aware artifacts:
4l!>"Whereis the nearest pizza restaurant?"
4l!>"Getme the document I was reading on the train yesterday"
4l!>"Remindme to buy some tooth paste when I am next near a supermarket"
4l!>s(ourinterpretation of the augmented reality setting described by Hull et aI., 2001)
It is important to note that in all of these situations it is the user and not the artifact who assigns
significance to specific aspects of the environment: aspects of the environment that suddenly become
significant are pizza restaurants, a specific document, toothpaste, and a cherry tree in a particular garden.
All of these aspects are part of the user's environment but the aspects only become significant because the
user makes the (informed) decision that these aspects are significant in relation to his or her current
situation.
Bellotti and Edwards (2001) outline that in many situations where context-aware systems have been
proposed or prototyped, human initiative is frequently required to determine what to do next. They
conclude that two key features must be supported by context-aware systems so that users may make
informed decisions based on context: intelligibility and accountability. By referring to intelligibility,
Bellotti and Edwards (2001) argue that context-aware systems systems must be able to represent to their
users what they know, how they know it, and what they are doing about it. By referring to accountability,
they argue that systems must enforce user accountability when they seek to mediate user actions that
impact others.
There is little doubt that demanding for intelligibility and accountability will help gain a better
understanding of responsibilities involved in the design of context-aware artifacts. It is questionable,
however, whether intelligibility and accountability help overcome the inherent limitations of context-
aware artifacts. Similar demands have been discussed extensively in the artificial intelligence field in the
context of expert systems and robotics. The problem is that explaining inferences works best with rather
simple settings and it is increasingly difficult the more complex the setting is. Projecting future
implications of proposed actions is even harder. Now the crux is that Bellotti's and Edwards's (2001)
demands for intelligibility and accountability are only necessary in settings that are already so complex
that context-aware artifacts are no longer able to -or not allowed to- make decisions on their own, i.e.,
without human supervision. Accordingly, demands for intelligibility and accountability are likely to be
intractable when applied to complex real world settings.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we have provided an explicit distinction between context and situation and we have outlined
that significant characteristics of situations are lost when situations are reduced to context descriptions.
Furthermore, we have related the creation of context descriptions to work on the frame problem in
artificial intelligence in order to argue that demanding intelligibility and accountability unlikely to help
overcome the general limitations of context.
There is no doubt that context-aware systems are here and that they are to stay. First, this means that it is
an empirical question in which situations and to what extent intelligibility and accountability will help
design better systems. Gadgets, such as mobile phones are likely to become the testbed for the next
generation of context-aware artifacts. Second, given the inherent limitations of context modeling,
designers of context-aware artifacts should take care that users are able to overrule a context-aware
artifact in such a way that the artifact's behavior does no longer interfere with the situation negotiated
among those participating in a situation. Mobile phones can be switched off but more complex artifacts
may be more difficult to 'overrule'. Sometimes, as in the case of a context-aware alarm clock, it could
even make sense if the artifact may 'decide' to resist overrule (switch off) attempts. Third, it will be
interesting to observe whether users will overrule annoying artifacts or whether they slowly adapt to
certain annoyances as in the case of mobile phones. Finally, we are interested in the question whether
context-aware artifacts are indeed able to deliver the benefit expected. In most cases, people are well
aware of their situation and have quite some expertise in using artifacts in an appropriate way (e.g., most
people turn off their mobiles during a theater audience because they know that mobiles ringing during
theater audiences are annoying). People also good at recognizing situation changes as they are part of the
negotiations that lead to changes. What is the benefit of making artifacts context-aware over making
artifacts easier to use?
6. REFERENCES
Agre, P. E. (2001). Changing places: contexts of awareness in computing. Human-Computer
Interaction, 16(2- 3).
Clancey, W. J. (1997). Situated cognition. Cambridge University Press.
Dey, A. K., Salber, D., and Abowd, G. D. (2001). A conceptual framework and a toolkit for supporting
the rapid prototyping of context-aware applications. Human-Computer Interaction, 16(2-3).
Dourish, P. (2001). Seeking a foundation for context-aware computing. Human-Computer
Interaction, 16(2-3).
Greenberg, S. (2001). Context as dynamic construct. Human-Computer Interaction, 16(2-3).
Grodin, J. (2001). Desituating action: digital representation of context. Human-Computer Interaction,
16(2-3).
Hull, R., Neaves, P., and Bedford-Roberts, J. (1997). Towards situated computing. In Proceedings of the
First International Symposium on Wearable Computers (ISWC'97), pages 146-153, IEEE.
Lave, J. (1991). Situated learning in communities of practice. In Resnick, L. B., Levine, J. M., and
Teasley, S. D., editors, Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, pages 63-82. American
Psychological Association, Washington, DC, USA. Third Printing April 1996.
Pfeifer, R. and Rademakers, P. (1991). Situated adaptive design: toward a methodology for knowledge
systems development. In Brauer, W. and Hernandez, D., editors, Proceedings of the Conference on
Distributed Artificial Intelligence and Cooperative Work, pages 53-64. Springer-Verlag.
Pylyshyn, Z. W., editor (1987). The robot's dilemma: the frame problem in artificial intelligence. Ablex
Publishing Corporation, Norwood, NJ.
Robertson, T. (2000). Building bridges: negotiating the gap between work practice and technology
design. Human-Computer Studies, 53, 121-146.
Suchman, L. A. (1987). Plans and situated actions - the problem of human-machine communication.
Cambridge University Press.
Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge University
Press. First Paperback Edition 1999.
